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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MAGILL, Senior Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal raises issues concerning the extent of 
coverage provided by Owner's, Landlord's and Tenant's 
Liability (OL&T) insurance policies. The appeal arises out of 
a suit by On Air Entertainment Corp. (On Air) against 
National Indemnity Co. (National) in which On Air, under 
an OL&T policy from National, sought defense costs and 
damages for bad faith in connection with the defense of two 
lawsuits (Suit One and Suit Two).1 On Air appeals the 
District Court's grant of National's motion for judgment as 
a matter of law on its bad faith claims, the Court's denial 
of its request to amend its complaint to add a fraud claim, 
and the Court's ruling that a release that it signed was 
enforceable and barred its action against National for 
damages in connection with Suit Two. National cross- 
appeals the District Court's finding that coverage exists 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We refer generically to the lawsuits filed against On Air in order to 
protect the privacy of the alleged minor rape victims who brought the 
suits. See generally 18 U.S.C.A. S 3509. 
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under the OL&T policy for Suit One and also appeals the 
District Court's holding that New Jersey law applies to the 
coverage issues. We affirm all of the District Court's rulings 
from which On Air appeals and reverse the District Court's 





In 1988, On Air purchased a standard OL&T insurance 
policy (Policy) from National to insure its premises.2 On Air 
produced two syndicated television teen dance shows called 
Dancing on Air and Dance Party USA (Dance Shows) on its 
premises. Edward O'Neil (O'Neil) was one of the hosts of the 
Dance Shows. In 1987, directors of On Air met with O'Neil 
regarding his off-show conduct with minor females who 
appeared on the Dance Shows and instructed him to not 
have any further involvement with underage females. 
Despite these warnings, O'Neil continued in a relationship 
with an underage female and was subsequently removed as 
a host of the Dance Shows. However, in 1989, On Air 
reinstated O'Neil as a host of the Dance Shows. Shortly 
after his reinstatement, O'Neil allegedly raped two minor 
females who were dancers on the Dance Shows. Both of the 
alleged rapes occurred on social occasions off On Air's 
premises. 
 
In January 1991, Suit One was filed against On Air 
alleging that On Air's negligent hiring and supervision of 
O'Neil contributed to the alleged rape of one of the 
underage females. On Air tendered Suit One to National, 
but National initially denied coverage under the Policy for 
various reasons. In October 1991, Suit Two was filed 
against On Air and contained similar allegations of 
negligent hiring and supervision. After receiving notice of 
Suit Two, National determined that while there was no 
coverage for either suit, it would defend both suits under a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The 1989 policy covered the period from December 31, 1988, to 
December 31, 1989. National first sold the OL&T insurance policy to On 
Air in 1985. The policy was renewed annually, the 1989 policy being the 
fourth renewal. 
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full and complete reservation of rights, pending a 
declaratory judgment action. 
 
Shortly after National agreed to take over the defense of 
the suits, Suit Two was settled by On Air's private counsel 
for $30,000 and National agreed to contribute $13,500 in 
exchange for a complete release of On Air. In connection 
with the settlement, On Air released National from all 
claims arising from Suit Two, including claims for coverage 
and attorneys' fees.3 Suit One settled in April 1994, and 
National paid the alleged rape victim $101,000 in exchange 
for a complete release of On Air. 
 
On March 29, 1996, On Air brought the current suit 
against National alleging bad faith in connection with Suit 
One and Suit Two and claiming that it was entitled to 
attorneys' fees in connection with the defense of the suits. 
The District Court denied National's motion for summary 
judgment on its claim that the Policy did not provide 
coverage for Suit One and Suit Two and ruled that New 
Jersey law applied to the coverage issues. On Air's suit was 
scheduled for a jury trial on September 30, 1997. Prior to 
trial, the District Court ruled that the Policy provided 
coverage to On Air for Suit One and Suit Two. The Court 
proceeded to trial on the remaining issues of whether 
National had acted in bad faith in connection with the 
suits, and the amount of attorneys' fees owed to On Air by 
National. 
 
On the third day of trial, the District Court informed On 
Air that it had not made a showing of bad faith by National. 
The Court allowed On Air to proffer all of its remaining 
evidence in order to make a showing of bad faith. Following 
On Air's proffer, the District Court granted National's 
motion for judgment as a matter of law on the bad faith 
claims. The Court scheduled the remaining issue, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Release provided, in relevant part: 
 
       Further, this "Settlement Agreement" contemplates and extinguishes 
       any claims which the "insureds" may have for expenses, interest, 
       costs, punitive damages, and/or attorney's fees arising out of 
claims 
       made as a result of the occurrence. The "insureds" acknowledge that 
       "National Indemnity" has made a good faith effort to resolve their 
       demands for judgment under the subject policy. 
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amount of attorneys' fees to which On Air was entitled, for 
trial in June 1998. Prior to the June 1998 trial, the District 
Court granted National's motion claiming that On Air was 
not entitled to any attorneys' fees in connection with Suit 
Two because On Air had signed a release of any potential 
claims.4 Following a bench trial on the issue of attorneys' 
fees in connection with Suit One, the Court awarded On Air 
$63,600.08 for attorneys' fees, plus interest accrued. 
Subsequently, the District Court denied National's motion 
for an order to vacate the judgment or for a new trial, and 




A. Choice of Law Issue 
 
National cross-appeals the District Court's ruling that 
New Jersey law controls the case and argues that 
Pennsylvania law should control. Because this is a diversity 
case, we apply the choice of law principles of Pennsylvania, 
the forum state. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 
313 U.S. 487, 496-97, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 1021 (1941). The 
District Court applied Pennsylvania's choice of law test, 
which it termed "a combination of the `most significant' test 
and an `interest' analysis," and held that New Jersey, and 
not Pennsylvania, law controls the case. 
 
National contends that the District Court misapplied 
Pennsylvania's choice of law test, and that Pennsylvania 
law should control the case. However, before a choice of law 
question arises, there must actually be a conflict between 
the potentially applicable bodies of law. See Lucker Mfg. v. 
Home Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 808, 813 (3d Cir. 1994); Williams v. 
Stone, 109 F.3d 890, 893 (3d Cir. 1997). National admits 
that it cannot point to any differences between 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey law relevant to this case. In 
addition, our own research has not identified any relevant 
differences. Under these circumstances, there is no conflict 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. On Air appeals the District Court's holding that the release was 
enforceable. On Air's claim has no merit and the District Court's ruling 
is affirmed without further discussion. 
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of law, and the court should avoid the choice of law 
question. See Lucker, 23 F.3d at 813. The court can, 
therefore, refer interchangeably to the laws of New Jersey 
and Pennsylvania in discussing the law applicable to the 
case. See id. 
 
B. Coverage under the Policy 
 
The District Court held that the Policy provided coverage 
in this case, but did not give the reasons for its ruling.5 On 
cross-appeal, National argues, among other things, that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The relevant portions of the Policy state: 
 
       The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the 
       insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of 
 
       A. bodily injury or 
 
       B. property damage 
 
       to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence and 
       arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the insured 
       premises and all operations necessary or incidental thereto, and 
the 
 
       company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against 
       the insured seeking damages on account of such bodily injury or 
       property damage, even if any of the allegations of the suit are 
       groundless, false or fraudulent, and may make such investigation 
       and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient, . . . 
 
"Occurrence" is defined in the Policy as: 
 
       An accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to 
       conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage 
       neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured. 
 
"Insured premises" is defined in the Policy as: 
 
       (1) the premises designated in the declarations, (2) premises 
       alienated by the named insured (other than premises constructed 
       for sale by the named insured), if possession has been relinquished 
       to others, and (3) premises as to which the named insured acquires 
       ownership or control and reports his intention to insure such 
       premises under this policy and no other within 30 days after such 
       acquisition; and includes the ways immediately adjoining such 
       premises on land. 
 
"Operations" are defined in the policy as: Teen dance TV shows, r/a 
theaters, motion pictures or television studios (including 10 remotes). 
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there is no coverage in this case because the Policy is an 
OL&T policy, a limited form of insurance which does not 
provide coverage for off-premises injuries. Our review of the 
District Court's coverage ruling is plenary. See Carey v. 
Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 189 F.3d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
National argues that OL&T policies, in contrast to 
broader comprehensive general liability policies, do not 
cover off-premises injuries such as those in the present 
case. On Air counters that the underlying lawsuits alleged 
that its negligence in hiring and supervising O'Neil resulted 
in the alleged rapes of the plaintiffs. On Air claims that 
because hiring and supervising necessary personnel, 
including the host, is "necessary or incidental" to the Dance 
Shows, one of the "operations" conducted on the insured 
premises, the injuries alleged in the lawsuit therefore 
"aris[e] out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the 
insured premises and all operations necessary or incidental 
thereto." 
 
Neither the parties' briefs nor our research reveal a 
decision by either New Jersey or Pennsylvania courts on the 
coverage provided by OL&T policies for off-premises 
injuries. Therefore, it is appropriate for the court to 
consider other state court decisions, federal decisions, and 
the general weight and trend of authority. See Farmers 
Alliance Mut. Ins. Co. v. Salazar, 77 F.3d 1291, 1294-95 
(10th Cir. 1996). In construing the policy language, we 
must keep in mind that it is well established that ambiguity 
in insurance contracts must be construed in favor of the 
insured. See Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Pipher, 140 
F.3d 222, 227 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
In construing the "operations necessary or incidental 
thereto" language in OL&T policies, one court has noted 
that "[n]umerous courts have addressed whether off-site 
injuries may be covered by such language in a premises 
liability policy, and there is a definite lack of consensus as 
to the correct result." Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Annapolis 
Bay Charters, Inc., 69 F.Supp.2d 756, 761-62 (D. Md. 
1999) (citation omitted). The cases construing OL&T 
policies can be grouped into three general categories: (1) 
cases holding that OL&T policies only protect against 
liability arising from the condition or use of a building and 
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not liability arising from the nature of the operations or 
activity conducted therein;6 (2) cases holding that OL&T 
policies can cover liability arising from the nature of the 
operations or activity conducted therein if the injury occurs 
on the insured premises;7 and (3) cases holding that OL&T 
policies cover liability arising from accidents occurring off 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In the first category are cases such as Harvey v. Mr. Lynn's Inc., 416 
So.2d 960 (La. Ct. App. 1982), where the court said that: 
 
       The purpose of owners', landlords' and tenants' liability insurance 
is 
       to protect against liability arising from the condition or use of a 
       building. This must be distinguished from insurance against 
liability 
       arising from the nature of the enterprise or activity conducted 
       therein. Put another way, an OLT policy does not cover liability 
       arising from the type of business activity which the insured 
       conducts in the building. 
 
Id. at 962 (citation omitted). Similarly, in American Empire Surplus Lines 
Ins. Co. v. Bay Area Cab Lease, Inc., 756 F.Supp. 1287 (N.D. Cal. 1991), 
the court said that: 
 
       The policy issued to Cab. Co. is a Landlord's Owner's & Tenant's 
       policy, and is limited by its terms to `accidents' occurring `on 
the 
 
       premises.' The type of policy issued to Cab Co. is intended `simply 
       to protect against liability arising from the condition or use of 
the 
       building as a building [and] must be distinguished from insurance 
       against liability arising from the nature of the enterprise or 
activity 
       conducted therein.' 
 
Id. at 1289 (quoting 11 Couch on Insurance Sd 44:379, at 551-552 (Rev. 
ed. 1982 and supp. 1989)). 
 
7. In the second category are cases such as Walthers v. Travelers 
Casualty and Surety Co., 1999 WL 793939 (D. Or. 1999), where the 
court held that the word "incidental" makes the OL&T provision 
extremely inclusive and that such a policy covers a corporation's 
negligence in hiring and supervision of a dentist and the making of 
dental appointments where the actions occurred on the insured 
premises. See id. at *5. See also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Annapolis Bay 
Charters, Inc., 69 F.Supp.2d 756, 761 (D. Md. 1999) (holding that an 
OL&T policy which stated that the relevant premises were the "offices- 
general" and "hardware-retail" areas of a certain building offered some 
coverage for business operations related to general office or hardware- 
retail activities, but the specialized business operation of chartering 
watercraft to be used off-site, even though the chartering occurred on 
the insured premises, did not qualify as a "use .. . of the premises"). 
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the insured premises if the injury has a sufficient nexus to 
the operations conducted on the insured premises. 8 
 
Although we believe that OL&T policies should not be 
confused with more comprehensive general liability policies, 
there is no need for us to decide which category of cases we 
agree with because even if we were to hold that OL&T 
policies provide coverage for off-premises accidents, there 
would still be no coverage in this case. An OL&T policy 
requires a causal connection between the injury and the 
ownership, maintenance or use of the premises. See 
Paraclete, 857 F.Supp. at 835 (stating that a sufficient 
connection exists when there is a reasonable causal 
connection between the ownership, maintenance or use of 
the premises and the injury). Unlike the cases where courts 
have found accidents arising out of the operations of an 
insured to be covered,9 in our case the accidents did not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In the third category of cases, courts have held that, in certain 
circumstances, off-premises accidents can be covered under OL&T 
policies. In Servants of the Paraclete, Inc. v. Great American Insurance 
Co., 857 F.Supp. 822 (D.N.M. 1994), the court said: 
 
       if Great American intended its insured to understand that the 
policy 
 
       only covered the physical condition of the Servants' facilities, it 
       should have so stated. At a minimum, it should have omitted the 
       language "and all operations necessary or incidental thereto . . ." 
       and limited coverage to accidents arising out of the"ownership, 
       maintenance or use of the insured premises . . . ." Any accident 
       resulting solely from the physical condition of the facilities 
would 
be 
       included within the more limited language. Great American's 
       contention makes superfluous the language "and all operations 
       necessary or incidental thereto . . . ." 
 
Id. at 836. The court held that coverage may exist under an OL&T policy 
for an off-premises accident if "there exists a sufficient connection 
between the injury and the insured's premises, including necessary or 
incidental operations on the premises." Id. ; see also Henry v. General 
Cas. Co. of Wis., 593 N.W.2d 913 (Ct. App. Wis. 1999) (holding that an 
off-premises automobile accident was covered under an OL&T policy 
where an automobile dealership provided a "loaner" to a customer whose 
car was being repaired at the auto dealership because the loan of the car 
was incidental to the dealership's auto business). 
 
9. In Paraclete, a nonprofit organization that treated a priest for 
pedophilia was sued for negligence in the treatment of the priest when 
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"arise out of . . . operations necessary or incidental" to the 
insured premises because the sexual assaults occurred on 
purely social outings and, thus, do not have the requisite 
causal connection to the insured premises. 
 
A sufficient causal connection cannot exist where the 
injury arose out of a social activity that had no connection 
to the operations of the insured. This principle was 
exhibited in Berne v. Continental Ins. Co., 753 F.2d 27 (3d 
Cir. 1995), where Berne, the insured owner of Berne's Ice 
Company, Inc., met with Joseph Flynn, the general 
manager of the Sapphire Beach Hotel, at the Slipaway Bar 
in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands. See id. at 28. The purpose of 
the meeting was to discuss the Hotel's indebtedness to 
Berne's Ice Company. See id. Berne, licensed to carry a 
pistol, brought his pistol with him to the meeting. See id. 
While awaiting his turn in a game of darts, Berne realized 
that the pistol he was carrying was loaded and moved to an 
adjacent corridor to unload the pistol. See id.  While he was 
unloading the pistol, it accidently discharged and the bullet 
passed through a wall and hit a customer of the bar. See 
id. Berne contended that his OL&T policy provided coverage 
because Berne carried the pistol in order to protect the 
receipts of the ice business from robbery, and the pistol 
was discharged during the course of a business meeting 
with Flynn. See id. at 29. The insurer, naturally, contended 
that the pistol was discharged after the business meeting 
was over when Berne and Flynn were engaged in a purely 
social game of darts. See id. The trial court found that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the priest, during the course of his treatment, allegedly sexually abused 
numerous parish children. See 857 F.Supp. at 826-27. The court found 
that the requisite causal connection was satisfied because the alleged 
negligence occurred within the insured facilities, and because one of the 
missions of the insured was the rehabilitation of pedophiliac priests, the 
alleged negligence detailed activities which were at least an "incidental" 
use of the insured's premises. See id. at 837. In Henry, the loan of the 
vehicle was directly related to the repair of the accident victim's car, 
and, 
thus, had a sufficient connection to the operations of the insured. See 
593 N.W.2d at 918-19. Similarly, in Walthers, where the claim involved 
the insured's negligent employment and supervision of a dentist, the 
injuries occurred during the course of the dentist's duties. See 1999 WL 
793939, at *1. 
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discharge of the pistol did not arise out of operations 
necessary or incidental to Berne's Ice Company's business. 
See id. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's 
holding, saying that there was evidence that the business 
discussion between Berne and Flynn took only a few 
minutes and that Berne carried a pistol not only for 
business purposes, but also for personal reasons when not 
engaged in business. Id.; see also Reznichek v. Grall, 442 
N.W.2d 545 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (a bowling alley 
proprietor's OL&T policy did not cover his negligent 
transmission of genital herpes to a sixteen-year-old girl as 
a result of sexual encounters that occurred on the bowling 
alley premises because there was no causal relationship 
between the plaintiff 's injury and the ownership, 
maintenance or use of the premises as a bowling alley). 
 
Similarly, in our case there is not a sufficient connection 
between the underlying injuries and the use of the insured 
premises because the injuries arose out of purely social 
outings that were unconnected to any of the operations of 
On Air. In Suit One, the complaint alleged that O'Neil asked 
the minor plaintiff to go to the mall with him. On the 
pretext of going to the mall, O'Neil told the plaintiff that he 
had to stop at his grandmother's house to pick up 
something. Upon arrival at his grandmother's house, O'Neil 
enticed the plaintiff into his bedroom and forcibly assaulted 
and raped her. Suit One involves injuries that arose from 
purely social circumstances, and the injuries' connection to 
On Air's operations are not sufficient to support a holding 
that the injuries "arose out of . . . operations necessary or 
incidental" to the premises. The District Court'sfinding of 
coverage and attorneys' fees under the Policy must 
therefore be reversed. 
 
C. Bad Faith Claims 
 
On Air appeals the District Court's grant of judgment as 
a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) 
on its bad faith claims against National. On October 3, 
1997, the District Court, after having heard On Air's 
witnesses' testimony and reviewing its exhibits and proffers 
in support of its claims, orally directed that a judgment as 
a matter of law be entered in favor of National on On Air's 
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claims of bad faith in disclaiming coverage under the Policy 
and bad faith in the defense of Suit One and Suit Two as 
well as its claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. On appeal, On Air argues that the District Court's 
ruling was erroneous. Our review of the District Court's 
grant of judgment as a matter of law is plenary. See Rego 
v. ARC Water Treatment Co. of Pa., 181 F.3d 396, 400 (3d 
Cir. 1999). 
 
On Air's claims do not have any merit. Bad faith in denial 
of coverage only exists if the insured's claim is not "fairly 
debatable." See Robeson Indus. v. Hartford Accident & 
Indem., 178 F.3d 160, 169 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying New 
Jersey law).10 In order to prove that a claim is not "fairly 
debatable," "the insured must `show the absence of a 
reasonable basis for denying benefits of the policy and the 
defendant's knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack of 
a reasonable basis for denying the claim.' " Id. (quoting 
Pickett v. Lloyd's, 621 A.2d 445, 453 (N.J. 1993)). The 
coverage issue in this case was "fairly debatable." On Air 
cannot show the absence of a reasonable basis for denying 
coverage, and, thus, On Air cannot show that National 
acted in bad faith in denying coverage.11  Similarly, On Air 
has not shown that National acted in bad faith in defense 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Similar to New Jersey law, "[a] refusal, with no good cause, to 
provide 
 
a defense or to indemnify when the policy provides for coverage violates 
Pennsylvania's bad faith insurance statute." Frog, Switch & Mfg. Co. v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 742, 751 n.9 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
11. Courts construing New Jersey law have indicated that a finding of 
coverage under the insurance policy is a predicate to a bad faith claim. 
See Hudson Universal, Ltd. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 987 F.Supp. 337, 343 n.3 
(D.N.J. 1997). On Air claims that even if there is no coverage under the 
OL&T policy, National denied coverage in bad faith because, at the time 
that it denied coverage, it based its decision on"occurrence" grounds 
contradicted by known case law and the advice of its counsel. However, 
courts have held that what is dispositive is whether, based on the facts 
existing at the time of the denial, a reasonable insurer would have 
denied the claim, so that even if the insurer gives an erroneous reason 
for denying coverage, if there is a valid basis for denying coverage, the 
insurer is not liable for bad faith. See Republic Ins. Co. v. Stoker, 903 
S.W.2d 338, 340-41 (Tex. 1995). 
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of Suit One and Suit Two and we affirm the District Court's 




In sum, we affirm the District Court's rulings from which 
On Air appeals, and reverse the District Court's holding of 
coverage and attorneys' fees under the OL&T policy. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 




12. On Air's other claims on appeal, that it is entitled to emotional 
distress and punitive damages in connection with the bad faith claims, 
and that it should have been allowed to amend its complaint to allege 
fraud are without merit and warrant no discussion. The District Court's 
rulings on those issues are affirmed. 
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